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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

MARK PLASKON,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

vs.

:

DARWIN HAYES, ET AL.,
Defendant/Respondents.

:

Case No. 950758CA

:

Priority No. 15

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Honorable J o n
Memmott, Judge of the Second Judicial Court of Davis County, State of Utah,
sitting without a jury, in which he awarded the Plaintiff a total Judgment
against the Defendants in the sum of $1,392.98, plus prejudgment 10%
interest from J u n e 10, 1988 through March 4, 1993. Jurisdiction is conferred
upon this Court pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) Utah Code Annotated,
(1953).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Whether the Trial Court erred in not granting Plaintiff additional
compensatory damages for replacement costs of the loss of his personal
property.
2. Whether the Trial Court erred in failing to award the Defendant loss of
business income during the years he was unable to use the decoys.
4. Whether or not punitive damages should have been awarded to the
1

Plaintiff against the Defendants for the deliberate violation of 38-3-1 Utah Code
Annotated.
5. Whether the Trial Court, after being given an opportunity through a
Motion to Reconsider to correct the above, abused its discretion in not
reconsidering its decision.
S t a n d a r d of Review

In this case the reviewing Court m u s t review the

case in the context of whether or not the Trial Court abused its discretion
a n d / o r failed to consider the appropriate legal doctrines with respect to
damages.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision awarding the Plaintiff a Judgment
rendered by the Honorable J o n Memmott, sitting without a jury. This case was
originally filed in Case No. 890746591 by the Plaintiff against the Defendants
for loss of personal property due to an improper sale of property stored in a
storage unit. The case originally came on for Trial before Judge Douglas
Cornaby, sitting without a jury on October 4, 1990. The Court dismissed the
case at that time based upon the argument that the Plaintiff did not have
standing. The case was appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals in Case No.
90587CA and the lower Court's decision was reversed. This Court found that
the Plaintiff did have standing and that the Defendants had deliberately
violated Section 38-3-1 Utah Code Annotated with respect to the notice
provisions and therefore, the case was remanded solely for determination of the
2

Plaintiffs damages.
A Trial was held before the Honorable Jon Memmott on February 17,
1993 wherein the Judge ruled in favor of the Plaintiff for damages for the loss
of decoys, but did not award the Plaintiff any other compensatory damages
with respect to the loss of income or replacement the decoys, or punitive
damages for the deliberate act.
A Motion to Reconsider was filed in June of 1994 because no Findings of
Fact or Conclusions of Law had been entered. The Court denied that Motion
on March 6, 1995 and this matter was then appealed on April 5, 1995.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

(All references to the Statement of Facts in this Brief will be to the
transcript of the first hearing in front of the Honorable Judge Douglas Cornaby
on October 4, 1990 which contained the essential facts and was not duplicated
in the second hearing and will be filed with this Court.)
That in June of 1987 the Plaintiff was residing in Bountiful, Utah with an
individual by the name of Paulette McFarland. (Tp. 9) At that time the Plaintiff
owned a large number of duck and game bird decoys which he utilized in a
guide service, guiding individuals on private hunting trips in the northern part
of Utah. (Tp. 10-11) Difficulties arose between the Plaintiff and McFarland,
causing McFarland to move all the Plaintiffs belongings, including the decoys,
from their residence to a storage unit.
On or about July 11, 1987 McFarland went to the Double D Storage unit
3

owned by the Defendants in this action and moved Plaintiffs property into a
unit. (Tp. 68-69) At that time a document entitled "Double D Storage Garage
Rental Agreement" was signed. The Agreement, although filled out by
McFarland, indicated that the Plaintiff agreed to rent the storage unit 108 for
one (1) month for a total of $40.00. The document was actually filled out by
Paulette McFarland (Tp. 35) in Plaintiffs name and countersigned by Carma
Jenkins, one of the owners of Double D Storage Garage. (Tp. 69) In addition,
McFarland told Jenkins that while she would pay the first months rent, the
Plaintiff would be responsible for any thereafter. This was acceptable to
J e n k i n s and she knew that Plaintiff was to be the responsible party. (Tp. 6970)
Following the initial conversation and the initiation of the storage unit,
the Defendants had no further contact with Paulette McFarland, and on
various occasions sent notices of delinquency to the Plaintiff. (Tp. 71)
That after a number of unsuccessful attempts to contact the Plaintiff a
decision was made to sell the contents. No notice was ever sent to the Plaintiff
concerning the sale of the property pursuant to Section 38-2-1 Utah Code
Annotated, nor was there a Sheriffs Sale or any public notice of a sale. (Tp. 78)
A private sale was made to an individual named J a m e s Kenneth Oswald in
J u n e of 1988. (Tp.54-56)
The Plaintiff was never restored to his decoys and was never
compensated for them despite demand until this matter came on for Trial on
4

February 17, 1993. At that Trial the Court heard evidence with respect to four
(4) values of the decoys. The replacement value in 1993, the 1990 resale value,
the value the Plaintiff paid for the decoys initially, and the amount paid by
James Oswald. (See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law attached hereto
as Appendix "A")
The Court rejected replacement value in its interpretation and simply
focused on the original amount Plaintiff paid for the decoys. The Court further
rejected any loss of income from the decoys despite the unrefuted testimony of
Plaintiff and Steve Brown, who indicated that the Plaintiff had a guide service
and would have been able to guide trips every year from 1987 on.
The Court's only basis for rejecting that amount was that the Court
found lack of credibility in the Plaintiffs testimony on in the year 1986 because
of income stated on a tax return and the cost of guiding hunts. The Court
never considered the continuation of the business in 1988 through 1993. (See
the Court's Ruling attached hereto as Appendix "B")
Following the second hearing the Court was asked to reconsider the
issues both replacement costs and the lack of award for loss of income and the
Court rejected the same. It is from that rejection that this appeal is taken.
STATEMENT OF COUNSEL

I, John T. Caine, represent to the Court that I was the attorney who
represented the Defendant at Trial. That I have prepared the Docketing
Statement, and have prepared this Brief.
5

I do believe there are meritorious appellate issues and that this appeal is
not frivolous.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Court erred in not considering as part of total compensatory
damages the replacement costs of the decoys and awarding some punitive
damage for the Defendants wilful sale and violation of Section 33-3-1 Utah
Code Annotated, and further abused its discretion following a Motion to
Reconsider in not giving Plaintiff additional damages for the loss of business
income.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
AWARD COMPENSATORY DAMAGES BASED
UPON THE CURRENT REPLACEMENT VALUE
OF THE DECOYS AND IN FAILING TO AWARD
PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR THE DELIBERATE
ACTS OF THE DEFENDANTS
In this case there are certain undisputed events. The first is that
Plaintiff stored expensive duck decoys and other duck hunting implements in
the Defendants' storage garage and did not pay the rent that was required. It
is also undisputed that the Defendants, contrary to the provisions of 38-3-1
Utah Code Annotated, as amended, deliberately disposed of those decoys
without giving any notice to the Plaintiff and did so at a greatly reduced price.
It is further undisputed that the Plaintiff had a hunting service in which he
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guided hunters and used the decoys during the Fall of each year, and was
unable to do so following the loss of the decoys through the sale. This guide
service had been publized on local television and was well known throughout
the Wasatch Front area.
The fact that the Court determined it was an avocation or an additional
vocation is irrelevant because there was no evidence disputing that Plaintiff did
indeed derive an income from these sources. The Court heard four (4) different
values with respect to the property and determined that it would consider only
the purchase price of the property when the Plaintiff originally purchased it.
This is in direct contravention of the law in this jurisdiction.
The Court is directed initially to the case of Winters v. Charles Anthony
Inc.. 586 P.2d 453 (Utah 1958) In that action the Utah Supreme Court
essentially adopted the Restatement of Tort position with respect to
determining damages for the property taking or destruction of personal
property. In that case the Court stated as follows in justifying giving
replacement value to the aggrieved party:
"Replacement value is the amount it would cost to replace the
property, Not the wholesale cost to manufacture a similar one. It
is well settled that the fundamental principle of damages for the
loss of bailed property is to restore the injured party to the position
he would have been in had it not been for the wrong of the other
party." (Id at 455)
In addition, the Court also held that the rule of damages is flexible that
can be modified in the interest of fairness (Id at 453) and also accepts the
7

Restatement of Torts position that the value of property does not entirely
control the determination of compensatory damages. Damages are allowable
for all the detriment proximately caused by the wrongful destruction of the
property, as long as damages are provable and reasonable. (Also see Damages
- 22 Am. J u r . 2 d 427)
This Court h a s more recently adopted this rationale of the Anthony case
in J e n k i n s v. Equipment Center Inc.. 869 P.2d 1000 (Utah App. 1994) wherein
it recites this case at 1004.
The Court's error therefore is because of the deliberate and wilful nature
of the Defendant's conduct, that it Court should have adopted the replacement
cost of the decoys at the time of Trial, which was a much higher value, either
under the theory that was the appropriate value or in the context of a punitive
award. To simply adopt only the original purchase price would not be concert
with the above referenced cases.
Because the Court did not apply the applicable law, the case should
therefore be remanded for a further hearing with respect to those values and
with a direction from this Court to the Court under the Anthony rationale,
apply that standard to the measure of damages.
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE
PLAINTIFF JUDGMENT FOR FUTURE LOSS
OF BUSINESS INCOME
In its ruling and in denying the Motion for Reconsideration the Court
8

completely refused to give the Defendant, as part of a measure of damages, any
loss of future business income. The Court's theory was essentially that
although there was uncontroverted evidence that the Plaintiff took hunting
parties out for a fee in the Fall and Winter of the year, and that a necessary
part of that hunting excursion was the use of the decoys, that because this was
a "avocation" rather than a primary vocation and because there was a certain
expense involved, the Court could not award damages.
There is no Utah case which says that the loss of business income is
based upon whether or not this is a person's primary business or not. The rule
is if in fact income is generated, whether it is a secondary business or
avocation, if the deliberate loss, deliberate destruction, or in this case the
deliberate sale without notice of the Plaintiffs property necessary to effect
income from the avocation, that this is a proper compensatory damage award.
While the Court did not accept the Plaintiffs figures for the 1986-1987
years because of his income tax, the Court further compounded the error by at
that point not considering lost income for future years when the
uncontroverted testimony of Steve Brown and Plaintiff clearly indicated that
there was a market for this type of service and that the Plaintiff had received
exposure on television as providing this type of guide service. This is not an
area of speculative damages which are not allowed by law, but certainly one
grounded in the realistic estimates of the Plaintiff who had previously guided
individuals and groups for upland game bird hunting.
9

The error in this case is essentially that the Court ruled as a matter of
law that because this was an avocation, the Plaintiff was not entitled to any
future damages. It is that specific ruling that Plaintiff takes issue with because
there is simply no basis for denying recovery when the uncontroverted evidence
was that this avocation did generate income.
This Court should direct that the case be remanded with a direction to
the Judge that even though this was not found to be full time job, the Court be
required to consider realistically the type of income that could be made over the
period of time and apply that as a measure of damages.
CONCLUSION
The Court erred in not considering as part of the compensatory damage
award the replacement value of the decoys and the punitive nature of the
Defendants' actions and further compounded the error by also not considering
or allowing the Plaintiff any damage for loss of business income.
The Plaintiff respectfully requests that the case be remanded for a further
evidentiary hearing with instructions from this Court to the fact finder to
consider these types of damages and re-evaluate the damage award in this
case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th daroFTpecemberD 1995.

CAINE, Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing Brief of Appellant to counsel for the Respondent, Jim Hanks, Attorney
at Law, 376 East 400 South, Suite #300, Salt Lake-City, Utah 84111, postage
prepaid this 13th day of December, l£95r—~
JOHN^TTMNE
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS O
STATE OF UTAH
MARK PLASKON,
FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
DARWIN HAYES,

Civil No. 890746591
Defendant.

The above entitled matter came on for Trial before the above
entitled Court on February 17, 1993, before the Honorable Jon
Memmott, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, sitting
without a jury.

The Plaintiff was present and represented by

counsel, John T. Caine and Defendant was present in Court, and
represented by counsel, James Hanks. The Court, after hearing the
testimony of the parties and arguments of counsel, and the Court
having received various exhibits and the Court having been fully
advised in the premises and acknowledging an order of the Utah
Court of Appeals entered on November 22, 1991 finding that the
Trial Court erred in finding no Contract existed between the
Plaintiff and Defendant and also further finding that the sale of
the Plaintiff's decoys was not conducted pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated

38-3-1

the

case

was

therefore,

remanded

determination of damages incurred by the Plaintiff.
7
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o

1

for

That Court

having heard this hearing having in mind that decision and having
heard the claim for damages now makes the following Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Court finds with respect to the claim for damages as to
the value of the decoys.
1.

That the Plaintiff did store the decoys at the

storage unit owned by the Defendant.
2.

That the Defendant selling the decoys did not comply

with the above referenced statute in notifying the Plaintiff or
bidding or in selling as a private sale.
3.

That the Court has received evidence of four (4)

different values:
a)

The first value, the 1993 retail value;

b)

The 1988 resale value;

c)

The value that Plaintiff paid for the decoys

initially; and
d) The amount paid for the decoys by James Oswald.
4.

In assessing

damages

the Court

finds that the

appropriate value to be assigned to the decoys is the amount
Plaintiff paid Flambo for the decoys which was $1,722.35 for all
but approximately 90 of the decoys.
5.

Based upon interpellation and the type of decoys the

Court finds that the value of the decoys was as follows: $62.20
for two

(2) dozen super magnum mallards, $29.65

for a dozen

floater geese, $312 for four (4) dozen mighty magnum Canada goose
2

shells, $156 for hovering windsocks and $56.10 for sumi magnum
decoys issue Ml, for a total together of $2,338.30.
6.

As a result of storage, forty percent (40%) of the

decoys deteriorated and were not useable.
7.

That the Plaintiff took the risk of storing the

decoys over two (2) summers and had the opportunity at any time to
pay the bill to remove those decoys.
8.
the

That Plaintiff should have been aware that the heat in

storage

unit

would

damage

the

decoys

and

bears

the

responsibility for storing them for over four (4) months without
paying the bill or checking on the decoys.

The Plaintiff's

actions were not prudent under the circumstances, therefore, the
Court assesses the forty percent (40%) loss due to deterioration
as the responsibility of the Plaintiff.
The Court finds with respect to the claim for loss of income.
1.

That Plaintiff's testimony was that in the hunting

season 1986-87 he conducted approximately ninety (90) hunting
trips for which he received $50 a trip for a total of $4,500.
2.

That

Plaintiff

further

testifies

that

the

Plaintiff's income tax return for the year 1986 showed his income
from that at $600.
3. That the Defendant's Interrogatories indicated that
Plaintiff made $1,000 a week during the aforesaid period or
approximately $8,000.

Q
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4. That the Court finds that the Plaintiff's testimony

Si
_i

D

S2 ..
s
5_ s
5s
O
C/5
I xtD -T
Z

^r 0>

is
co 5

°

lacks credibility because of the inconsistencies in the above

statements and it appears to the Court that the Plaintiff does not
have an accurate record of what his income was and that his
figures are an estimate.
5. The Court further finds that no matter which of the
amounts was

accurate, these

were

gross

income

figures

and

Defendant had expenses based upon that income which impacted his
income.
6.

Concerning the Plaintiff's income for 1987 for a

number of reasons, including obtaining a new position in a job,
marital problems, the Plaintiff chose, on his own accord, not to
continue his business.

He had the opportunity to if he desired

to. That in 1987-88 the Plaintiff decided not to continue in the
hunting or guide business; in 1988 again the Plaintiff had the
opportunity

if he wanted to contact people to continue the

business, but reasons of his own choice, decided not to continue
the business for the first part of the 1988 season.
7. That the Plaintiff had skill and enjoyed hunting and
taking others hunting, but this was never intended to be a full
time job and was more of a avocation rather than a vocation.
8.

Therefore, because of the above facts, the Court

does not any net positive income.
WHEREFORE, from the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the
Court concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That the actual value of the decoys and other personal

property items stored was $2,338.30.

That this value should be

reduced by forty percent (40%) on the basis that they were damaged
due to the responsibility and actions of the Plaintiff in the case
and an additional offset of $10 which is the net difference in the
rent due, thus awarding Judgment

from Plaintiff against the

Defendant in the sum of $1#392.98 plus prejudgment ten percent
(10%) interest from the date of the sale, June 10, 1988.
2. That further, based upon the foregoing Findings the Court
awards no damages for loss of income.
3.

The Court awards no attorney's fees to either party.

DATED this

1Q^ day of Sfii*

1994.

-JnvJNV. tV\ W ^ ^
JON MEMMOTT
District Court Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT
TO:

DEFENDANT AND HIS COUNSEL, JIM HANKS:
YOU WILL PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned Attorney for

Plaintiff will submit the above and foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law to the District Court Judge for his signature
upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date this Notice is
mailed to you unless written objection is filed prior to that time
pursuant to Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice in the District
Courts of the State.of Utah. Kin^Ly^govern youj^elf accordingly.
DATED this

^> 0

day of

Attorney for Plaintiff
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HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JON M. MEMMOTT, DISTRICT
JUDGE, FARMINGTON, UTAH.

14
APPEARANCES
15
FOR THE PLAINTIFF

JOHN CAINE
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN
2568 WASHINGTON BLVD.
OGDEN, UT 84401

FOR THE DEFENDANT

JAMES HANKS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
175 E. 40 SOUTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UT

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

JOANNE PRATT, CSR
JUSTICE COMPLEX
800 WEST STATE STREET
FARMINGTON, UT 84025

84102

~T~~

FEBRUARY 17, 1993

2

THE COURT:

THANK YOU.

AS TO THE CLAIM FOR

3

LOSS OF INCOME, THE COURT WOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING

4

FACTUAL FINDING AND RULINGS.

5

PLAINTIFF —

6

IS THAT IN THE YEAR OF 1986- '87, APPROXIMATELY 90

7

HUNTING TRIPS IN WHICH HE RECEIVED $50 A HUNTING TRIP.

8

THAT WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY $4,500, BASED ON HIS

9

TESTIMONY, OF INCOME THAT YEAR.

AND IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE

THE TESTIMONY OF —

PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY,

HOWEVER, THE COURT FINDS

10

THAT THERE'S SOME LACK OF CREDIBILITY IN THE PLAINTIFF'S

11

TESTIMONY AS TO THE INCOME AND HUNTS FOR THE YEAR 1986

12

WITH THE TAX RETURN INDICATING THAT THERE WAS $600 A YEAR

13

INCOME.

14

INTERROGATORIES INDICATE A THOUSAND DOLLARS A WEEK,

15

APPROXIMATELY $8,000 INCOME.

16

COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF REALLY DOESN'T HAVE AN ACCURATE

17

RECORD OF WHAT HIS INCOME WAS AND THAT IT REALLY IS AN

18

ESTIMATE.

19

THERE'S SOME QUESTION AS TO WHAT THE TRUE LEVEL OF INCOME

20

WAS FOR 1986.

21

THAT THERE HAS TO BE CLEARLY EXPENSES BASED ON THAT

22

INCOME.

23

IN EXCESS OF $5,000

24

THE TAX RETURN INDICATED ON HIS ANSWER TO INTERROGATORIES

25

THAT THE GAS EXPENSE ALONE IS $1,800 A YEAR, THE GUN SHOW

THE AFFIDAVIT INDICATES ANOTHER AMOUNT.

THE

THAT IT APPEARS TO THE

BUT EVEN GIVING THAT ESTIMATE, I THINK THAT

HOWEVER, THAT'S GROSS INCOME AND I THINK

AND BASED ON THE TAX RETURN, THOSE EXPENSES ARE
FOR THE FIRST YEAR.

BUT EVEN ABSENT

1

—I—RENTAL $125 A YEAR, THE LUNCH IS $450, AND THAT'S NOT
2

REFLECTING ANY EXPENSES FOR DECOYS OR OTHER THINGS THAT

3

ARE PROPER AND NECESSARY EXPENSES IN THE BUSINESS. ALSO

4

AS TO THE NATURE OF THE INCOME IN 1987 THEN, FOR A NUMBER

5

OF REASONS, INCLUDING OBTAINING A NEW POSITION IN A JOB,

6

MARITAL PROBLEMS, FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS THE PLAINTIFF

7

CHOSE OF HIS OWN ACCORD NOT TO CONTINUE THE BUSINESS. HE

8

HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO, IF HE DESIRED TO.

9

'88 DECIDED NOT TO CONTINUE IN THE HUNTING OR GUIDE

BUT IN 1987-

10

BUSINESS.

IN 1988 AGAIN HAD THE OPPORTUNITY, IF HE HAD

11

WANTED, TO CONTACT THE PEOPLE TO CONTINUE THE BUSINESS,

12

BUT FOR REASONS OF HIS OWN CHOICE, DECIDED NOT TO

13

CONTINUE THE BUSINESS FOR THE FIRST PART OF THE 1988

14

SEASON.

15

MAYBE NOT A VOCATION, IT WAS MORE OF AN AVOCATION OF THE

16

PLAINTIFF, SOMETHING THAT I THINK HE CLEARLY ENJOYED

17

DOING, THAT HE HAD SKILL.

18

EVIDENCE THAT THIS WAS EVER INTENDED TO BE A FULL-TIME

19

JOB, PROFESSION OF THE PLAINTIFF.

20

I THINK, THE NA JRE THAT THAT WAS GOING TO BE A FULL-TIME

21

POSITION DURING THE HUNTING SEASON.

22

THAT THE COURT DOESN'T FIND ANY NET POSITIVE INCOME IN

23

ANY EVIDENCE PRESENTED, WHEN YOU TAKE THE COST, THE COURT

24

DOESN'T FIND THAT THERE WAS NET POSITIVE INCOME.

25

ON THAT, THE COURT DOES NOT FIND A BASIS TO AWARD ANY

THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS THAT WHILE THIS WAS

BUT THE COURT DOESN'T FIND

HE DIDN'T DEMONSTRATE,

AND BECAUSE ALSO

2

BASED

"1—DAMAGES BASED ON LOSS Of INCOME AND THEREFORE WOULD GRANT
2

THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION AS TO THAT PART OF THE CASE.

3

MR. HANKS:

THANK YOU VERY MUCH, JUDGE.

4

(CONCLUSION OF PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT.)
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